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INTRODUCTION 
Information and know-how are crucial for businesses in devel-
oping and maintaining a competitive advantage in today’s econo-
my.1 The important role of trade secrets has grown over the past 
few decades with the emergence of the global information society.2 
Intellectual property and other intangible assets account for as 
much as 75% of most organizations’ value and sources of revenue.3 
Trade secrets are unique among intellectual property rights be-
cause they are highly pervasive and relevant for virtually all busi-
nesses; businesses frequently use trade secrets regardless of their 
industry or size, and trade secrets are crucial for maintaining com-
petitive advantages.4 Each year, trade secret theft costs multina-
tional companies billions of dollars.5 However, the exact cost of 
trade secret theft for US companies is uncertain because many of 
the victims do not become aware of the crime until years later.6 
Additionally, companies may not report the theft or intrusion be-
cause announcing a breach could tarnish a company’s reputation 
and endanger its business relationships.7 The increase in technolo-
gy use—both by companies and the actors responsible for stealing 
trade secrets—is one factor contributing to the exponential in-
crease in trade secret litigation that has occurred over the past few 
decades.8 Additionally, “[t]he storage of data overseas ‘has made 
                                                                                                                            
1 LORENZO DE MARTINIS ET AL., STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL 
BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 1 (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_final-
study_en.pdf. 
2 See id.; see also CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, TRADE SECRET 
THEFT: MANAGING THE GROWING THREAT IN SUPPLY CHAINS 1 (2012) (“Over the past 
30 years, international trade has increased more than sevenfold and represents a third of 
all global economic activity.”). 
3 Trends in Proprietary Information Loss, ASIS International, 37 (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf. 
4 de Martinis et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
5 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, supra note 2, at 1. 
6 OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US 




8 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTERPRISE AND TRADE, supra note 2, at 6. 
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intellectual capital theft more prevalent and prosecution much 
more difficult.’”9 
A priority of the United States government is addressing the 
theft and transfer of innovative technology trade secrets overseas.10 
According to the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator (“IPEC”),11 trade secret theft and economic espio-
nage against corporations based in the United States is accelerat-
ing.12 The foreign competitors of these corporations are recruiting 
current and former employees of United States corporations to 
steal trade secret information and some of these competitors have 
ties to foreign governments.13 Trade secret theft through cyber in-
trusion is affecting law firms, academia, and financial institutions in 
addition to United States corporations.14 The United States gov-
ernment is going to continue to apply diplomatic pressure on for-
eign governments to discourage trade secret theft and to encourage 
them to strengthen their enforcement against trade secret theft.15 
As a trade policy tool, IPEC enlists the United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) to help promote international enforce-
ment against trade secret theft in order to prevent unfair competi-
tion against United States companies.16 Every year, the USTR 
                                                                                                                            
9 Id. at 6 (quoting MCAFEE, UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
AND SENSITIVE CORPORATE DATA NOW THE LATEST CYBERCRIME CURRENCY 5 (2011), 
available at http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Cyber/Documents/rp-under
ground-economies.pdf. 
10 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-
plan.pdf. 
11 IPEC coordinates the work of the Federal government to prevent intellectual 
property theft. To accomplish this, IPEC works with “relevant Federal agencies, law 
enforcement organizations, foreign governments, private companies, public interest 
groups, and others to develop and implement the best strategies” to combat intellectual 
property theft. IPEC, About IPEC, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/intellectual
property/ipec (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
12 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ADMINISTRATION 





15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 4. 
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conducts a review of the intellectual property rights and state of 
intellectual property enforcement in trading partners around the 
world.17 The “Special 301” Report is published annually, reflecting 
the findings of the USTR’s review.18 The 2014 Special 301 Report 
again emphasized the need to protect trade secrets because the 
theft and other forms of economic espionage appear to be escalat-
ing.19 In particular, the report reflected the United States’ concern 
with the growth of trade secret theft in China and China’s gaps in 
trade secret protection and enforcement.20 The Special 301 Report 
stressed the difficulty of obtaining remedies for trade secret misap-
propriation under Chinese Law.21 
The United States government is becoming increasingly con-
cerned with trade secret theft occurring in China.22 According to a 
2011 report to Congress on foreign economic collection and indus-
trial espionage prepared by the Office of the National Counterintel-
ligence Executive (“ONCIX”), “Chinese actors are the world’s 
most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”23 
There has been a barrage of computer network intrusions originat-
ing in China.24 Although cybersecurity specialists and other Ameri-
can private-sector firms reported these intrusions, the intelligence 
community has been unable to confirm who is responsible for the 
attacks.25 Mandiant, an independent security firm, reported in 
2010 that during the course of a business negotiation where a US 
                                                                                                                            
17 AMBASSADOR MICHAEL B.G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 




19 Id. at 16 (“The theft of trade secrets and other forms of economic espionage, which 
imposes significant costs on US companies and threatens the security of the United 
States, appears to be escalating.”). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See FROMAN, supra note 17 and accompanying text. China has been on the 301 
Special Report Priority Watch List every year since 2005. See INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ALLIANCE, CHART OF COUNTRIES’ SPECIAL 301 PLACEMENT (1989-2013) AND IIPA 2014 
SPECIAL 301 RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/
2014SPEC301HISTORICALCHART.pdf. 
23 OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, supra note 6, at i. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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Fortune 500 manufacturing company was seeking to acquire a Chi-
nese firm, information was stolen from the company’s corporate 
servers.26 The US company lost sensitive data on a weekly basis 
and this may have helped the Chinese firm attain a better position 
in the negotiations.27 Mandiant concluded that “‘The Chinese 
government may authorize this activity, but there’s no way to de-
termine the extent of its involvement.’”28 
In February of 2013, Mandiant published a follow up report in 
which they changed their assessment and concluded that “the 
groups conducting these activities are based primarily in China and 
that the Chinese Government is aware of them.”29 According to 
the report, the Advance Persistent Threat, which Mandiant refers 
to as APT1, is likely a Chinese government-sponsored actor and a 
unit of the People’s Liberation Army known as Unit 61398 or the 
Second Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff De-
partment’s Third Department.30 The report also identifies the per-
sona “Ugly Gorilla” as a hacker in the unit and concludes that the 
person behind the persona is a man named Wang Dong.31 The re-
port “details efforts by an arm of the People’s Liberation Army 
starting in 2006 to systematically infiltrate 141 companies in over 
twenty major industries, including 115 US companies.”32 Hun-
dreds of terabytes of data, including all forms of trade secrets, were 
stolen from these US companies.33 
In May 2014, the United States charged state actors with eco-
nomic espionage for hacking into computers and stealing trade se-
                                                                                                                            
26 Id. at 5. 
27 Id. 
28 MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 2 (2013), 
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (citing 
MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2 (2010), available at https://dl.mandiant.com/ee/assets/
pdf_mtrends_2010.pdf.). 
29 MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 2 (2013). 
30 Id. at 2–3. 
31 Id. at 52, 55. 
32 FROMAN, supra note 17, at 33 (“The industries targeted have been listed as 
‘strategic,’ emerging industries that need to be fostered and encouraged as part of 
China’s 12th Five Year Plan.”). 
33 Id. at 13. 
594 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:589 
 
crets for the first time.34 Five Chinese military hackers were in-
dicted by a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania on 
thirty-one counts, including economic espionage, trade secret 
theft, computer hacking, and other offenses against Westinghouse 
Electric Co., United States subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG (“So-
larWorld”), United States Steel Corp (“US Steel”), Allegheny 
Technologies Inc. (“ATI”), the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, 
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service 
Workers International Union (“USW”), and Alcoa Inc.35 These 
intrusions began as early as 2006 and in some of the cases, the in-
formation would have been particularly beneficial to Chinese com-
panies at the time it was stolen.36 One of the five defendants named 
in the indictment is Wang Dong a.k.a. “UglyGorilla.”37 He and the 
other defendants worked for the People’s Liberation Army’s Gen-
eral Staff, Third Department in Unit 61398.38 The defendants sent 
“spearphishing”39 messages to trick the recipients into giving them 
access to their computers.40 Once the defendants had a foothold in 
a computer, they “performed a variety of functions designed to 
identify, collect, package, and exfiltrate targeted data.”41 However, 
it is unlikely that any of the defendants will actually face trial be-
cause China does not have an extradition treaty with the United 
                                                                                                                            
34 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military 
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for 
Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html. 
35 Indictment ¶¶ 5, 6(a)–6(f), 46, 55, 57, United States v. Dong, Crim. No. 14-118 
(W.D. Pa. filed May 19, 2014). The indictment explains the particular intrusions and the 
events leading up to the intrusions against the six victims in further detail, with most of 
the victims having significant business interests relating to China. Id. ¶¶ 19-42. 
36 Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
37 Id. ¶ 5. 
38 Id. The hacker Wang Dong a.k.a. “UglyGorilla” and Unit 61398 were mentioned in 
the 2013 Mandiant Report, which supports Mandiant’s conclusion that this group was 
responsible for other cyber intrusions and that the Chinese government is aware of them. 
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
39 Spearphishing messages are designed to look like email messages from colleagues 
and other trustworthy senders and encourage the recipient to open an attachment or click 
on a link. These attachments and links are also disguised. However, once the attachment 
or link is opened, malware is installed in the computer, which creates a backdoor 
providing access to the recipient’s computer. Indictment, supra note 35, ¶ 11. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. ¶ 18. 
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States.42 Consequently, trade secret owners must be afforded via-
ble enforcement options in China. 
The Chinese government was also implicated in a civil suit that 
settled in 2012.43 Cybersitter LLC settled a $2.2 billion civil suit for 
an undisclosed amount.44 The suit alleged that several computer 
makers colluded with the Chinese government to develop web-
filtering software using code that was stolen from Cybersitter.45 
According to Cybersitter, the software that was allegedly stolen 
was the first filtering software to block both pornographic and vio-
lent online content.46 Researchers at the University of Michigan 
determined that the Green Dam program, which was part of a plan 
announced by the Chinese government to filter pornographic, vio-
lent, and political content on computers within China, copied 
roughly 3,000 lines of code from Cybersitter’s software.47 A group 
of the Chinese companies involved filed motions to dismiss for a 
lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and for failure 
to join a necessary and indispensable party, but all of the motions 
were denied.48 Default judgment was entered against the Chinese 
government because it did not appear and was not immune under 
the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act.49 Interestingly, one of the defendants in the case, 
Zhengzhou Jinhui Computer System Engineering Co., had ties to a 
research center for China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army 
University.50 Additionally, six days after the suit was filed, the law 
firm that filed the suit was hit with a similar cyber intrusion.51 A 
forensic analysis of the attack determined that it probably origi-
                                                                                                                            
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012). 
43 Edvard Petersson, Lenovo, Computer Makers Settle Case Over Green Dam Software, 






48 CYBERsitter, LLC v. P.R.C., 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962–63, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
49 Id. at 974. 
50 Michael Riley, China Mafia-Style Hack Attack Drives California Firm to Brink, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
27/china-mafia-style-hack-attack-drives-california-firm-to-brink.html. 
51 Id. 
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nated in China as well.52 After filing the suit, Brian Milburn, whose 
company owns the software, also experienced highly unusual activ-
ity on his company’s servers, which stopped two months after the 
parties reached a settlement agreement.53 
Recent federal investigations and prosecutions indicate an 
emerging trend of trade secret theft and economic espionage on 
behalf of companies located in China.54 The Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) prosecutes trade secret cases resulting from investiga-
tions by various government agencies, including the Homeland Se-
curity Investigations (“HSI”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and 
Science (“BIS”), and the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investiga-
tive Service (“DCIS”).55 Since 2008, a large number of these cases 
involved the theft of trade secrets from the United States to Chi-
na.56 For example, in January of 2013, a Chinese business owner 
and his employee pleaded guilty for conspiring to steal trade se-
crets from the Pittsburgh Corning Corporation on how to produce 
a particular type of insulation.57 Both Ji Li Huang and Xiao Guang 
Qi were Chinese nationals and attempted to steal the secrets in or-
der to compete with Pittsburgh Corning after Corning announced 
it would open a facility in China.58 Huang attempted to gather the 
information by trespassing at the plant, recording videos, taking 
                                                                                                                            
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2011 U.S. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 30 (2012), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf. 
55 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-RELATED CRIMINAL CASES 
(JANUARY 2008 TO THE PRESENT: UPDATED MARCH 26, 2014) 1 (2014), available at 
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/OngoingExportCaseFactSheet.p
df. 
56 See generally id. (providing summaries of select cases of export enforcement, 
economic espionage, trade secret theft, and embargo related prosecutions handled by the 
DOJ from January 2008 through March 2014). 
57 Id. at 26. 
58 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, Two Chinese Nationals Charged 
with Stealing Trade Secrets from Missouri Manufacturing Plant (Sept. 30, 1998), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2012/two-chinese-nationals-
charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets-from-missouri-manufacturing-plant. 
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photos, and asking employees specific information about the insu-
lation.59 An advertisement was later published in the local newspa-
per soliciting someone with experience at Pittsburgh Corning to 
help develop a factory producing a similar in the Asian market.60 A 
confidential source working with the FBI corresponded via email 
with the contact in the advertisement about the Pittsburgh Corn-
ing’s confidential information.61 Huang and Qi were arrested after 
a meeting with the confidential source in Kansas City, where they 
intended to pay $100,000 in exchange for the trade secrets.62 
The United States government is not alone in the growing con-
cern over trade secret theft in China. In 2009, McAfee63 published 
a report about intellectual property vulnerabilities analyzing a sur-
vey conducted by the international research firm, Vanson 
Bourne.64 The firm surveyed more than one thousand senior IT 
decision makers from several countries, including the US and Chi-
na.65 Exactly half of the respondents to the survey viewed China as 
the greatest threat to digital assets and 26% of the respondents sur-
veyed had purposely avoided storing and/or processing data in 
China.66 Slightly over 30% of the respondents found the United 
States to be threatening to digital assets, placing the United States 
in the middle of the list out of the countries reported.67 Germany 
was perceived as the least threatening, with slightly less than 20% 
of respondents.68 The respondents to the survey were primarily 
concerned with both the lack of privacy and intellectual property 
                                                                                                                            
59 Crabtree Aff. in Support of App. for Criminal Complaint ¶¶ 10–14, United States v. 
Huang, Crim. No. 12-0156-SWH-01/02 (W.D. Mo. 2012). 
60 Id. ¶ 15. 
61 Id. ¶¶ 16–48. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 49–51. 
63 Founded in 1987 and now part of Intel Security, McAfee is a global computer 
security company protecting millions of consumers, ranging from government agencies to 
home users. MCAFEE, CORPORATE FACTSHEET 1 (2014), available at http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/brochures/br-mcafee-fact-sheet.pdf. 
64 MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 1–2 (2009), 
available at https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_
online_012109.pdf. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 Id. at 12–13, 14. 
67 Id. at 12. 
68 Id. 
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protection in China.69 Two years later, McAfee published a follow-
up report and China, Russia, and Pakistan were still regarded as the 
least safe for data storage, while Germany and the United States 
continued to be perceived among the safest.70 This Note analyzes 
trade secret protections under Chinese Law and why, from a legal 
perspective, it is a growing area of concern. It will then compare 
China with the trade secret protections under the United States’ 
common-law system and Germany’s civil-law system. Finally, it 
will propose reforms to China’s current system, in order to change 
current perceptions on trade secret protections in China. 
I. TRADE SECRETS IN CHINESE LAW 
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law is the primary source for 
trade secret law in China.71 In China, a trade secret (or business 
secrecy) is defined as “any technology information or business op-
eration information which is unknown to the public, can bring 
about economic benefits to the obligee, has practical utility and 
about which the obligee has adopted secret-keeping measures.”72 
Article 10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law also provides three 
different ways a person can be held liable for trade secret misap-
propriation.73 Liability can also extend to a third party “who clearly 
                                                                                                                            
69 Id. at 14. 
70 MCAFEE, UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND SENSITIVE 
CORPORATE DATA NOW THE LATEST CYBERCRIME CURRENCY 10 (2011), available at 
http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Cyber/Documents/rp-underground-
economies.pdf. 
71 Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secret Protection in China, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 355 (2011). 
72 Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdong Jingji Fa (中 
人民共和国反不正当 争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 
(China), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=125970. 
73 Id. (“A business operator shall not use any of the following means to infringe upon 
trade secrets: (1) obtaining an obligee’s trade secrets by stealing, luring, intimidation or 
any other unfair means; (2) disclosing, using or allowing another person to use the trade 
secrets obtained from the obligee by the means mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or 
(3) in violation of the agreement or against the obligee’s demand for keeping trade 
secrets, disclosing, using or allowing another person to use the trade secrets he 
possesses.” The Act defines a “business operator” as “a legal person or any other 
economic organization or individual engaged in commodities marketing or profit-making 
services (“commodities” referred to hereinafter includes such services).” Id. at art. 2. 
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knows or ought to know that the case falls under the unlawful acts 
listed in the preceding paragraph shall be deemed as infringement 
upon trade secrets . . . .”74 Accordingly, the party alleging misap-
propriation must prove that: 
(1) the asserted trade secret is not publicly known; 
(2) the asserted trade secret has economic benefits 
and practical utility; 
(3) the trade secret owner has taken measures to 
protect the confidential nature of the asserted trade 
secret; and 
(4) there is misappropriation of the asserted trade 
secret by a wrongdoer or a third party.75 
The first three of these elements that a party alleging misap-
propriation must prove are required to satisfy the statutory defini-
tion of a trade secret under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.76 
The information that was allegedly misappropriated will not be 
protected unless it first qualifies as a trade secret.77 After the party 
alleging misappropriation qualifies the information as a trade se-
cret, it must then satisfy the fourth element and prove that there 
was some sort of misappropriation.78 Additionally, this must all be 
accomplished through admissible evidence,79 which can be a partic-
ularly difficult concept while litigating in China.80 Provisions relat-
ing to the enforcement of trade secrets can also be found in the 
Contract Law (Article 43 and Chapter 18 Section 3), Company Law 
(Articles 149 and 150), Labor Law (Articles 22 and 102), and Labor 
Contract Law (Article 23).81 
A. Administrative Action 
Chinese Law provides three different avenues for trade secret 
holders to pursue claims against alleged trade secret misappropria-
tion. One such avenue is for a trade secret holder to pursue admin-
                                                                                                                            
74 Id. at art. 10. 
75 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356. 
76 Id. at 355–56. 
77 See generally Bai & Da, supra note 71. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 356. 
80 See infra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
81 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356–57. 
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istrative action against an alleged infringer. Under the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law, trade secret misappropriation cases can be in-
vestigated by the offices of the Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (“AICs”).82 An important feature that is available to 
trade secret holders through administrative action is that the AICs 
have the authority “to order the return of drawings, blueprints, and 
other materials containing the trade secrets.”83 Additionally, if cer-
tain goods would disclose the trade secret to the public if they were 
made available, AICs have the authority to order the destruction of 
the goods manufactured using the trade secret.84 In terms of other 
remedies, AICs have the authority to order an infringer to stop mi-
sappropriating the trade secret and to impose a civil fine ranging 
from RMB 10,000 to RMB 200,000.85 Another advantage of an 
administrative proceeding is its speed; AICs will “act in a matter of 
days or even immediately” if the AICs is “presented with satisfac-
tory evidence.”86 One of the major disadvantages for the trade se-
cret owner is that AICs do not have the power to award damages.87 
Consequently, if damages are sought, the trade secret owner must 
instead turn to civil litigation.88 
B. Criminal Action 
A trade secret owner should consider seeking criminal prosecu-
tion whenever the owner has suffered “serious” or “exceptionally 
serious” losses due to the misappropriation of the trade secret by 
another party.89 This is because in a criminal prosecution, the Chi-
nese police will become involved and they have the power to seize 
any evidence relevant to the case.90 Under the Criminal Law, the 
following acts cause “serious” or “exceptionally serious” losses: 
                                                                                                                            
82 Id. at 361–62. 
83 Id. at 362. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in China, 47 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 2018 (2014). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 359. 
89 Id. at 364. 
90 Id. 
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 acquiring a trade secret of another by theft, 
inducement, duress or other illegal means; 
 disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a 
trade secret of another acquired by the above 
illegal means; 
 disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a 
trade secret in breach of an agreement or a 
confidentiality obligation imposed by a legal 
owner; or 
 acquiring, using, or disclosing a trade secret by a 
third party, when he knew or should have known 
that the trade secret has been misappropriated 
in any of the aforementioned ways.91 
The acts resulting in criminal liability are strikingly similar to 
the civil liabilities under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.92 Ac-
cording to a 2004 Judicial Interpretation issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, a loss is “se-
rious” if it is more than RMB 50,000 and “exceptionally serious” 
if it is more than RMB 2,500,000.93 A subsequent Judicial Interpre-
tation was issued in 2007 and expanded the 2004 Judicial Interpre-
tation to apply to entities as well.94 Generally, criminal prosecution 
is very effective in trade secret misappropriation cases and is very 
desirable because the evidence seized by police can also be used in 
                                                                                                                            
91 Id.; see also Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中 人民共和国 华 刑法) [Criminal 
Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar, 14, 1997, effective 
Oct. 1, 1997), art. 219 (China). 
92 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 356. 
93 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also 最高人民法院、最高人民 察院 于 检 
关 办理侵犯知 刑事案件具体 用 识产权 应 法律若干 的解 问题 释 [Interpretation of 
the Supreme People’s Court & the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Concerning Some 
Issues on the Specific Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement 
upon Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the 10th Procutorial Comm. Of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 8, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004) Fashi 19/2004 
(China). 
94 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also 最高人民法
院关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释, Interpretation II of the 
Supreme People’s Court & the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Concerning Some Issues 
on the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, (promulgated by the 10th Procuratorial Comm. of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, April 5, 2007, effective April 5, 2007) Fashi 6/2007 
(China). 
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administrative or civil litigation.95 However, it is not easy to get the 
police interested in trade secret cases and they tend to be more in-
terested in high profile cases.96 Additionally, the police lack “ex-
pertise in trade secrets involving advanced technology,” so they 
will have to entrust a “state owned technology research institute or 
consultancy organization” to determine the first two elements in a 
trade secret misappropriation claim.97 
C. Civil Action 
In 2007, the Supreme People’s Court issued a Judicial Inter-
pretation clarifying some of the issues that arose enforcing trade 
secrets under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.98 The Judicial In-
terpretation clarified some of the terms included in the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law’s definition of trade secrets, injunctions available 
in trade secret misappropriation cases, how to determine damages, 
defenses that can be raised, and the burden of proof in trade secret 
cases.99 According to the Judicial Interpretation regarding the defi-
nition of trade secrets, information is considered “unknown to the 
public”100 if the information is unknown to the personnel in the 
related field and the information is difficult to obtain.101 Informa-
                                                                                                                            
95 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 364–65; see also Chow, supra note 86, at 1029 n.123 
(noting that most defendants do not feel safe ignoring the investigatory powers of the 
Chinese police because the investigative powers are “backed by various coercive 
measures”). 
96 Bing & Da, supra note 71, at 365 (according to the authors, it is beneficial to try to 
package any given trade secret case as high profile to increase the chances for criminal 
prosecution); see also Chow, supra note 86, at 1034 (providing that police “may have little 
interest in economic crimes, unless these economic crimes result in harm to the public . . . 
or threaten national security . . . .”). 
97 Chow, supra note 86 at 1032; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text (listing 
the elements of a trade secret misappropriation claim). 
98 最高人民法院关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释, 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Matters About the Application 
of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition], Fashi 2/2007 (Sup. 
People’s Ct. 2007) (China) [hereinafter Judicial Interpretation], available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/iotspcosmataolittocciuc1390/. 
99 Id. at arts. 9–17. 
100 This is the first element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade secret 
and also the first element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Bai & Da, supra 
note 71, at 355–56. 
101 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 9. The Judicial Interpretation also 
includes a list of information that is not unknown to the public: (1) information that is 
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tion is considered to “bring about economic benefits to the obli-
gee”102 and have practical utility103 if the information has any prac-
tical or potential commercial value, and can be used to enhance the 
competitive advantage of the owner.104 Finally, regarding the defi-
nition of what constitutes a trade secret, the owner of the informa-
tion has sufficiently maintained its secrecy105 if the owner takes 
reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the divul-
gence of the information.106 Additionally, courts shall ascertain 
whether the owner has taken confidentiality measures in accor-
dance with the features of the related information carrier, the de-
sire of the owner to maintain secrecy, how identifiable the confi-
dentiality measures are, the difficulty for others to obtain the in-
formation by justifiable means, and other factors.107 
The Judicial Interpretation also provides for two defenses to a 
claim of trade secret misappropriation: independent research and 
                                                                                                                            
common sense or industrial practice for people in the related technical or economic field; 
(2) information that only involves the simple combination of dimensions, structures, 
materials and components of products, and can be directly obtained by observing the 
products by the relevant public after the products enter into the market; (3) information 
that has been revealed to the public in any publication or other mass media; (4) 
information that has been publicized through reports or exhibits; (5) information that can 
be obtained through other public channels; and (6) information that can easily be obtained 
with little cost. Id. 
102 This is the second element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade 
secret and also the part of the second element a party alleging misappropriation must 
prove. See Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 355–56. 
103 This is the third element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade secret 
and also part of the second element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Id. 
104 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 10. 
105 This is the fourth element that must be proved to qualify information as a trade 
secret and also the third element a party alleging misappropriation must prove. Bai & Da, 
supra note 71, at 356. 
106 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 11. 
107 Id. The Judicial Interpretation also provided a non-exhaustive list of sufficient 
confidentiality measures: (1) limiting access to the classified information and disclosing it 
only to the related personnel who need to know the information; (2) locking up the carrier 
of the classified information; (3) indicate the confidentiality of the information on the 
carrier of the information; (4) adopting passwords or codes on the classified information; 
(5) implementing a confidentiality agreement; (6) limiting visitors to the classified 
machinery, factory, workshop or any other place, or imposing confidentiality agreements 
on visitors; and (7) any other reasonable measure guaranteeing the confidentiality of the 
information. See id. 
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reverse engineering.108 Reverse engineering covers information 
that is obtained by dismantling, mapping, or analyzing the product 
when the product is obtained from public channels.109 A party who 
acquires another’s trade secret through illegitimate means110 is not 
afforded the protections of the reverse engineering defense.111 The 
Judicial Interpretation also places a high burden of proof on the 
plaintiff to successfully assert a claim of trade secret misappropria-
tion.112 The plaintiff must submit evidence that is sufficient to satis-
fy all of the statutory requirements under the Anti-Unfair Competi-
tion Law, evidence proving that the defendant is using similar or 
substantially similar information to the plaintiff’s trade secret, and 
that the defendant has used unfair methods.113 
The Judicial Interpretation also elaborated on the remedies 
available to trade secret owners through civil litigation. There are 
three acceptable methods for calculating damages awards in trade 
secret misappropriation cases: “(1) plaintiff’s lost profits; (2) de-
fendant’s profits realized from the misappropriation; and (3) rea-
sonable royalty.”114 Additionally, if the trade secret was made 
known to the general public, the damages awarded to the plaintiff 
shall be calculated according to the commercial value of the trade 
secret.115 If a plaintiff successfully proves a claim of trade secret 
misappropriation, it is likely that a permanent injunction will be 
                                                                                                                            
108 Id. at art. 12. 
109 Id. 
110 Examples of what constitutes acquiring through illegitimate means are contained 
within the Anti-Unfair Competition Law are (1) obtaining the trade secret of another by 
theft, inducement, duress, or any other unfair means; (2) disclosing, using, or allowing 
others to use another’s trade secret which was obtained by the aforementioned unfair 
means; or (3) disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a trade secret in breach of an 
agreement with the legal owner. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
111 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 12. So, for example, a party who obtains 
the trade secret of another by any means other than independent research and 
development or reverse engineering, and then claims that it was through reverse 
engineering, will not be afforded the reverse engineering defense. See id. 
112 Id. at art. 1. 
113 Id. at art. 14. 
114 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 361. 
115 Id. (explaining that “[t]he commercial value of a trade secret shall be determined 
with reference to its research and development costs, proceeds from practicing the trade 
secret, the tangible benefits, the length of time during which the trade secret confers 
competitive advantages to the plaintiff, etc.”). 
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granted.116 However, in China, trade secret owners are no longer 
entitled to an automatic permanent injunction after they success-
fully prove misappropriation.117 As Benjamin Bai and Guoping Da 
assert, “[g]enerally, the length of a permanent injunction will not 
be extended to the time when the trade secret becomes known to 
the general public, if at all.”118 Further, if the length of an injunc-
tion is unreasonable under the circumstances and the owner’s 
competitive advantage is protected, a court may limit the scope and 
length of an injunction.119 
D. Chinese Trade Secret Case Statistics 
In 2013, Chinese courts of the first instance accepted 88,583 
civil cases concerning intellectual property rights.120 This is signifi-
cant when compared to data from 2010, where Chinese courts of 
the first instance received 42,931 total civil cases concerning intel-
lectual property rights, a 40.18% increase over 2009.121 These are 
dramatic increases, especially because China has been the most li-
tigious country for intellectual property disputes since 2005.122 
2013 Civil IP Cases in China123 
Type of Case Number Percent Change From 2012 
Civil Cases (commenced) 88,583 +1.33% 
Civil Cases (concluded) 88,286 +5.29%  
Copyright 51,351 –4.64%  




119 Id.; see also Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 16. 
120 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION BY CHINESE COURTS IN 2013 (2013) [hereinafter SUPREME 
PEOPLE’S COURT], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zscq/bhcg/201404/
t20140425_195314.html. 
121 China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, NAT’L INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY 
STRATEGY (May 12, 2011), http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=11395. 
122 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 351. 
123 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120. 
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Patent 9,195 –5.01% 
Trademark 23,272 +17.45%  
Unfair Competition (includes trade 
secret cases) 
1,302 +15.94%  
Technology Contract Agreements 949 +27.21%  
Other 2,514 +13.91%  
 
2010 Civil IP Cases in China124 
Type of Case Number Percent Change From 2009 
Civil Cases (commenced) 42,931 +40.18%  
Civil Cases (concluded) 41,718 +36.74%  
Copyright 24,719 +61.54%  
Patent 5,785 +30.82%  
Trademark 8,460 22.5%  
Unfair Competition (includes trade 
secret cases) 
1,131 –11.78%  
Technology Contract Dispute  670 –10.31%  
Other 1,966 +14.17%  
 
                                                                                                                            
124 China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121. 
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2013 Administrative IP Cases in China125 
Type of Case Number Percent Change From 2012 
Administrative Cases (com-
menced) 
2,886 –1.43%  
Administrative Cases (concluded) 2,901 Negligible 
Copyright 3 None 
Patent 697 –8.29%  
Trademark 2,161 +0.51%  
Other 25 +66.67%  
 
  
                                                                                                                            
125 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120. 
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2013 Criminal IP Cases in China126 
















1,546 2,462 N/A 
Production and Sale 
of Counterfeit and 
Inferior Goods 
1,496 2,221 N/A 
Illegal Mfg. and Sale 
of Illegally Mfg.’d 
Marks of Registered 
Trademarks 
350 589 N/A 
Counterfeiting Patent 1 0 N/A 
Copyright Infringe-
ment 
1,499 1,490 N/A 
Sale of Infringing Re-
productions 
15 33 N/A 
Trade Secret Cases127 50  N/A 
People Convicted for 
Trade Secret Misap-
propriation 
71  N/A 
 
                                                                                                                            
126 Id. 
127 Interestingly, the data for the number of trade-secret cases concluded and the 
number of persons convicted, 50% and 71% respectively, is exactly the same as the data 
provided in 2010. Compare SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120, with China’s 
Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121. 
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2010 Criminal IP Cases in China128 
 China Percent Change From 2009 
Criminal Prosecution  
(concluded) 
3,942 +7.7% 
People Prosecuted 6,001 +2.8% 
People Convicted 6,000 +2.9% 
Trade Secret Cases Sentenced 50 N/A 





                                                                                                                            
128 China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 121. 
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2012 14 7 (11) 300,000 95,000 (2) 0 0 40% 
2011 38 9 (17) 1,670,993 397,377 (8) 89,986 26,002 35% 
2010 47 5 (25) 1,314,496 273,635 (13) 34,494 6,640 47% 
2009 52 8 (15) 6,839,600 209,250 (8) 23,367 21,646 39% 
2008 55 9 (22) 732,030 215,511 (22) 15,709 14,656 48% 
2007 63 7 (21) 505,789 309,758 (25) 7,701 3,040 63% 
2006 52 6 (23) 822,323 423,856 (12) 14,736 4,245 39% 
 
The data compiled for the 2013 civil, administrative, and crimi-
nal intellectual property cases in China yields some surprising re-
sults regarding trade secrets. Out of all of the civil intellectual 
                                                                                                                            
129 CIELA Summary Report: Trend by Year, CIELA http://www.ciela.cn/
Search/TrendByYearResult.aspx?pageId=1&ppId=2&language=en&city=&court=&main
Type=Unfair+Competition&subType=Trade+Secret&cause=&industry= (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2015). There is a discrepancy between the data provided SIPO and the data 
provided by CIELA. This is because the data used by CIELA only comes from judgments 
published by major IP courts around China. See FAQ, CIELA 
http://www.ciela.cn/Content2.aspx?pageId=10&ppId=10&language=en (last visited Jan. 
29, 2015). 
130 See also Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 354–55 (illustrating the number of trade secret 
misappropriation cases per year from 1995–2005). 
131 Refers to the average time in months for proceedings to conclude. The number in 
parenthesis indicates the number of judgments used to calculate the data. CIELA 
Summary Report: Trend by Year, supra note 129. 
132 The number in parenthesis indicates the number of judgments used to calculate the 
data. 
133 Refers to the number of judgments in which in final injunction is awarded. This does 
not include data on either pre-trial injunctions or interim injunctions because judgments 
do not currently contain this data. Id. 
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property cases commenced in 2013, only 1,302 out of the 88,583 
were about unfair competition, which is roughly 1.47% of the total 
number of cases.134 Although this number represents a 15.94% in-
crease since 2012, it is miniscule when you consider that trade se-
cret cases only account for a percentage of that 1.47%.135 There are 
similar results with respect to the criminal cases. Out of the 9,212 
cases that were concluded, only 50 trade secret cases were sen-
tenced.136 This too accounts for a very small percentage of all of the 
criminal intellectual property cases, roughly 0.5%.137 These num-
bers are even more startling when compared to the data from 2010. 
Out of all of the civil intellectual property cases commenced in 
2010, only 1,131 out of the 42,931 were about unfair competition, 
which is roughly 2.6% of the total number of cases.138 The percen-
tage of actual trade secret cases is even smaller because they are 
contained within the unfair competition metric. Out of the 3,942 
criminal cases that were concluded in 2010, only 50 trade secret 
cases were sentenced.139 This too accounts for a very small percen-
tage of all intellectual property cases, roughly 1.3%.140 Although the 
total number of civil and criminal intellectual property cases has 
dramatically increased, the number of trade secret cases has re-
mained relatively stagnant and accounts for smaller percentages. 
II. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS IN CHINESE TRADE SECRET 
LITIGATION 
A. Specific Legal Obstacles for Trade Secret Owners 
One possible reason for the significantly lower amount of trade 
secret cases in China as compared to other intellectual property 
cases is the difficulty for plaintiffs to actually prove misappropria-
tion.141 This section explores various evidentiary concerns in Chi-
                                                                                                                            
134 See supra note 123 and accompanying table. 
135 See id. 
136 See supra note 126 and accompanying table. 
137 See id. 
138 See supra note 124 and accompanying table. 
139 See supra note 128 and accompanying table. 
140 See id. 
141 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 351, 354. 
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nese trade secret litigation, including obtaining evidence, evidence 
preservation, and suggested reforms to Chinese civil procedure, 
and how it impacts trade secret enforcement. 
Remedies available to trade secret owners through administra-
tive, criminal, or civil enforcement are difficult to obtain under 
Chinese law.142 This is the result of various deficiencies in China’s 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law, most notably the constraints on ga-
thering evidence for use in litigation.143 Additionally, the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law does not expressly authorize judges to 
issue certain provisional orders.144 This is different from other 
Chinese intellectual property laws and these provisional orders are 
often critical to the success of a civil enforcement action.145 Other 
weaknesses in China’s civil enforcement system include “mechan-
isms for gathering evidence; procedures for obtaining preliminary 
injunctions; and the relative weight afforded certain kinds of evi-
dence, as reflected in the overreliance on original documentary 
evidence over oral testimony.”146 Without changes to these areas, 
effective trade secret enforcement in China will continue to be a 
challenge.147 
                                                                                                                            
142 See FROMAN, supra note 17, at 32. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. Recent changes to China’s Civil Procedure Law permit judges to issue 
preliminary injunctions, but not enough time has passed to determine whether these 
changes have been effective in practice. Id. However, there have been positive recent 
developments. See infra notes 182–97 and accompanying text. 
145 FROMAN, supra note 17, at 32. Provisional orders, such as preliminary injunctions, 
are particularly important in trade secret cases because they can prevent the defendant 
from continuing to use the information in question until a final judgment is rendered. 
This can prevent the defendant from utilizing the information to make a profit and, more 
importantly, limit the likelihood of any further dissemination of the information. See infra 
Part II.B. 
146 FROMAN, supra note 17, at 33. 
147 Id. There have been positive developments in reforming trade secret protection 
China. For example, at the twenty-fourth US–China Joint Commission on Commerce and 
Trade (“JCCT”), China’s National Leading Group on Combating IPR Infringement and 
the Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Substandard Goods committed to publish 
an Action Program on trade secret protection and enforcement. The program is expected 
to include concrete enforcement actions, improving public awareness about trade secrets, 
and requirements for strict compliance with trade secret laws. However, it is unclear 
whether this will have any significant positive impact. See 24th US-China Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
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If a company is unable to protect its trade secrets, it weakens 
the incentive for the company to develop new technologies in Chi-
na and could lead a company to withhold its most advanced tech-
nologies from China.148 Both of these factors could severely ham-
per China’s innovation development.149 The concern over trade 
secret protection in China has grown significantly since 2011 and 
the Chinese government has recognized the value of stronger trade 
secret protection.150 However, despite the growing concern over 
trade secrets, Chinese officials still have limited experience in deal-
ing with these issues because of the small number of trade secret 
cases brought before administrative and judicial bodies.151 One of 
the problems trade secret owners have in misappropriation claims 
is that unlike other forms of intellectual property—such as patents 
and trademarks—trade secrets are not formally registered with 
government authorities and officials do not have “a formal written 
document to prove that a company holds a purported trade se-
cret.”152 
Trade secret owners trying to protect their information in Chi-
na often face the challenge of gathering and using evidence to 
prove infringement.153 In civil proceedings, “plaintiffs must collect 
and submit their own evidence to meet their burden of proof re-
garding, inter alia, trade secret misappropriation and damages.”154 
Because Chinese courts rarely accept evidence unless it is in its 
original form, documentary evidence is the only evidence that car-
ries significant weight in court and limits the admissibility of wit-
ness testimony.155 Because there is no US-style discovery under the 
                                                                                                                            
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/Decem
ber/JCCT-outcomes (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
148 THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING 




150 See id. at 1, 2. 
151 Id. at 5; see also supra Part I.D. and accompanying text. 
152 THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 5. 
153 Id. at 6. 
154 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363. 
155 See id. at 363–64; see also Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中 
人民共和国 华 民事 法 诉讼) [Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the 
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Chinese system, a plaintiff would need to know about the existence 
of evidence before seeking an evidence preservation order.156 Fur-
thermore, illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in court and 
could be grounds for reversal on appeal.157 Consequently, the best 
strategy for trade secret owners is often to adopt strong preventive 
measures to avoid having to litigate in the first place.158 
This evidentiary challenge often discourages companies from 
filing trade secret cases in China and can help explain the low num-
bers in the charts above.159 According to the US-China Business 
Council, “these challenges foster a broad perception that trade se-
cret enforcement is difficult in China, discouraging companies 
from bringing their products, services, and know-how to China, 
which prevents Chinese consumers and businesses from having 
access to the latest technologies.”160 Even if the parties are able to 
obtain this evidence, there is still a lack of clear information on how 
the evidence will be protected during and after a trial.161 One of the 
most important features of a trade secret is that it is secret.162 Con-
sequently, trade secret owners will be reluctant to bring claims if 
they cannot be assured that the confidentiality of the information 
will be maintained both during and after the trial.163 There is no 
guideline at the national level164 and unless the verdict is in favor of 
the plaintiff, there is no clear obligation on courts to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information disclosed during trial.165 This 
                                                                                                                            
standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007), art. 68 
(China). 
156 Chow, supra note 86, at 1028. 
157 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363; see also, 最高人民法院关于民事
诉讼证据的若干规定, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings (promulgated by the Jud. Comm. of Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 21, 2001, 
effective Apr. 1, 2002), at 68, Fa Shi 33/2001 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2001) (China). 
158 See Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 365; see also Chow, supra note 86 at 1038-39. 
159 See THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, at 7. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 2. 
163 See id. at 8. 
164 The Jiangsu Higher People’s Court released guidelines stating that all parties 
(including expert panelists) involved in a trade secrets case must sign a guarantee to the 
court not to disclose or use trade secrets disclosed during trial, but no such obligation 
exists on a national level. This is similar to a protection order. See id. 
165 Id. 
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drastically escalates the risks of pursuing litigation and further dis-
suades trade secret owners from bringing trade secret misappropri-
ation claims in Chinese civil courts.166 
Two final areas of concern are evidence preservation and pre-
liminary injunctions. Evidence preservation is a tool that is often 
used by trade secret owners to obtain evidence of misappropria-
tion.167 An evidence preservation order is a court ruling that re-
quires a defendant to preserve and submit evidence to the court.168 
If the circumstances prescribed in Article 74 of the Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law apply, a party may seek such an order ex parte.169 
The judges usually enforce an evidence preservation order them-
selves and the court may demand the requesting party to post a 
bond.170 These orders can be especially effective because the res-
pondent is required to produce the relevant documentation and 
evidence on the spot and is not notified of the order in advance.171 
Any evidence that is obtained and verified by the court is admissi-
ble in the subsequent proceedings.172 Because evidence preserva-
tion can be such a powerful tool, courts have tried to prevent its 
abuse by requiring the movant to first present some preliminary 
evidence, which as discussed earlier can be very difficult to ob-
tain.173 
Out of all of the intellectual property rights cases in 2013, Chi-
na granted 77.78% of all preliminary injunction applications, 97.63% 
of preservation of evidence applications, and 96.97% of all preserva-
tion of property applications.174 At first glance, these may seem like 
                                                                                                                            
166 See id. 
167 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363. 
168 THE US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 8. 
169 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363 (Article 74 provides: “Under circumstances where 
there is a likelihood that evidence may be destroyed, lost, or difficult to obtain later, the 
parties in the proceedings may apply to the People’s Court for preservation of evidence. 
The People’s Court may also on its own initiative take measures to preserve such 
evidence.”); see also Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中 人民共和国 
华 民事 法 诉讼) [Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Oct. 28, 2007), art. 74 (China). 
170 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 363. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 363–64; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
174 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120. 
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effective enforcement measures based on the high rates of applica-
tions granted, but the rates appear to be deceptively high. In 2013, 
courts of the first instance accepted 88,583 total intellectual prop-
erty cases.175 However, out of those 88,583 cases, eleven cases in-
volved applications for preliminary injunctions, 173 involved appli-
cations for evidence preservation, and forty-seven involved preser-
vation of property.176 So in reality, 0.012% of all intellectual proper-
ty cases for 2013 involved applications for preliminary injunctions 
and out of that 0.012%, 77.78% of applications were granted.177 Pre-
servation of evidence applications comprised 0.195% of all intellec-
tual property cases and of that 0.195%, 97.63% were granted.178 Pre-
servation of property applications comprised 0.053% of all intellec-
tual property cases and of that 0.053%, 96.97% of applications were 
granted.179 
Similarly, out of all of the intellectual property rights cases in 
2010, China granted 97.46% of preservation of evidence applica-
tions.180 As with the 2013 percentages, “pre-screening” by the 
Case Filing Division (“CFD”) probably contributes to the high 
grant rate because they do not reveal how many cases were rejected 
by the CFD.181 This perception changes if you compare the number 
of applications with the total number of civil cases admitted at first 
instance.182 In 2010, there were 294 pretrial preservation of evi-
dence applications and 42,931 intellectual property civil cases ad-
mitted at first instance.183 This accounts for a mere .68% out of all 
of the cases filed in 2010.184 This makes the chances of a trade se-
cret owner obtaining this important tool look very bleak. 
Preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases are particularly 
important because they enable a plaintiff to prevent a defendant 
                                                                                                                            
175 Id.; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
176 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 120. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 Mark Cohen, “Case Filing” In China’s Courts and Their Impact on IP Cases, China 
IPR (Mar. 24, 2012), available at http://chinaipr.com/2012/03/24/case-filing-in-chinas-
courts-and-their-impact-on-ip-cases/. 
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from further using the information before a final judgment is ren-
dered.185 They also limit the likelihood of any further dissemination 
of the trade secret by the defendant.186 However, obtaining a pre-
liminary injunction is difficult in trade secret cases because it is 
much more difficult for a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of success 
on the merits of the case.187 In China, it is unusual for a plaintiff to 
obtain a preliminary injunction for trade secret misappropriation.188 
The rate at which preliminary injunctions are granted suffers from 
the same inflation issues as applications for preservation of evi-
dence. The reported grant rate for preliminary injunctions in civil 
intellectual property cases in 2010 was 89.74%.189 There were a to-
tal of fifty-five pre-trial applications for preliminary injunctions in 
civil intellectual property cases, out of 42,932 total cases admitted 
at first instance.190 According to these figures, only 0.12% of the 
civil intellectual property cases requested preliminary injunctions, 
which would probably be an even smaller number in regards to the 
total number of trade secret cases.191 This appears even bleaker 
when compared to the 0.012% of civil intellectual property cases for 
2013.192 Consequently, preliminary injunctions are not as readily 
available as they seem and are yet another challenge facing a trade 
secret owner trying to enforce his rights. 
B. Recent Reforms and Other Considerations 
The Chinese Civil Procedure Law was recently revised and the 
new law went into effect in the beginning of 2013.193 There were 
                                                                                                                            
185 THE US–CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 148, at 8. 
186 Id. This can be crucial for trade secret owners because even if the plaintiff prevails in 
a misappropriation action, a court can still order an injunction that lasts until the 
information becomes known to the general public, or, if that is unacceptable, for another 
period or scope determined by the court. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 98, at art. 16. 
If the information is disseminated because a preliminary injunction is not issued, it could 
severely limit the protection a prevailing party will receive. 
187 Bai & Da, supra note 71, at 361. 
188 Id. 
189 Cohen, supra note 180. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. 
192 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
193 Mark Cohen, Crossing the River by Feeling the IP Stones: How China’s Civil Procedure 
System Benefits from Reforms Made in IP Civil Litigation, China IPR (Nov. 8, 2012), 
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numerous reforms, including an article that obliges courts to make 
their judgments publicly available unless there are issues involving 
privacy, state secrets, or trade secrets.194 One of the most impor-
tant reforms for trade secrets is Article 100, which extended inter-
locutory injunctions to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and con-
sequently, trade secrets.195 This was applied in Eli Lilly v. Huang,196 
a trade secret dispute between a US pharmaceutical corporation, 
its Chinese subsidiary, and a former chief researcher of that subsid-
iary.197 Huang began his employment on May 3, 2012 and signed a 
confidentiality agreement with his employer.198 A few months later 
on January 27, 2013, Huang downloaded twenty-one documents 
from the company’s server, but was not authorized to do so.199 
Huang refused to delete the documents despite numerous requests 
by Eli Lilly and instead chose to resign.200 Eli Lilly filed suit under 
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, seeking injunctive relief and 
RMB 20,000,000 in damages.201 In August 2013, the Shanghai 
First Intermediate Court issued an interlocutory injunction against 
Huang and Eli Lilly deposited RMB 100,000 as a security bond for 
the order.202 By doing so, the court applied Article 100 of the new 
Civil Procedure Law and granted interim measures that used to 
only be available under patent, copyright, and trademark law.203 
This was a very important decision for trade secret owners, but the 
long-term effects of the new Civil Procedure Law are still unclear. 
However, this may be the beginning of a new trend. In January 
of 2014, a Chinese subsidiary of Novartis was granted China’s first 




195 Christine Yiu & Yijun Ge, Eli Lilly v. Huang: Shanghai Court issues interlocutory 
injunction against breach of trade secret, BIRD & BIRD (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2013/china/eli-lilly-v-huang-shanghai-
court-issues-interlocutory-injunction-against-breach-of-trade-secret. 
196 This decision is not publicly available and has not been published because it involves 
trade secrets and confidential information. 
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pre-suit injunction in a trade secret dispute.204 In the case, a former 
employee downloaded roughly 880 documents from the company’s 
database after he resigned, and later joined a competitor.205 Novar-
tis applied for the injunction “seeking to restrain the ex employee 
from disclosing, using, or allowing others to use the documents 
containing trade secrets and related confidential information.”206 
The petition was accepted the same day it was filed and the injunc-
tion was issued within forty-eight hours.207 The Shanghai First In-
termediate Court issued the injunction—the same court that issued 
China’s first in-suit preliminary injunction in Eli Lilly v. Huang.208 
One final aspect to consider is the relative speed at which Chi-
nese courts turn over intellectual property decisions. Overall, it 
seems that China has a shorter notion of time when it comes to in-
tellectual property than the United States.209 For example, trade 
secret owners should consider that Chinese employees tend to 
leave their current employment as frequently as once every two to 
three years.210 In terms of litigation, there is a six-month time limit 
on a domestic intellectual property rights court proceeding of first 
instance.211 The speed of these proceedings can be both beneficial 
and detrimental to trade secret owners. Faster proceedings mean 
that a trade secret owner can get a permanent injunction in a rela-
tively short amount of time and can better protect its competitive 
advantage.212 However, this “rocket docket” can also be detrimen-
tal in the sense that they only have six months for a type of high 
stakes case where the burden of proof on the plaintiff is relatively 
high and admissible evidence is difficult to obtain.213 
                                                                                                                            
204 Benjamin Bai, Preliminary Injunctions in China: the Pendulum Has Swung Back!, 






209 See Mark Cohen, China IP Time and The New York Minute, CHINA IPR (Nov. 21, 
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C. China, Germany, and the United States 
China, Germany, and the United States are all members of the 
World Trade Organization. Germany and the United States were 
among the first members and joined in January of 1995.214 China 
did not become a member of the World Trade Organization until 
several years later in December of 2001.215 All three countries are 
also bound by the minimum standards set out by the World Trade 
Organization’s 1994 TRIPS Agreement.216 Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement concerns “undisclosed information” and establishes 
the minimum requirements for information to be protected under 
the Agreement.217 Importantly however, the TRIPS Agreement 
does not provide a minimum requirement for adverse parties to 
obtain evidence or information from one another.218 Judicial au-
thorities only have the power to order that the opposing party pro-
duce the evidence and this is subject to the protection of confiden-
tial information.219 Consequently, China’s current evidentiary pro-
cedures are acceptable under the minimum standards set out by the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
                                                                                                                            
214 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2015). 
215 Id. 
216 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
217 Id. at art. 39 (The information is protected as long as it: “(a) is secret in the sense 
that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally 
deal with the kind of information in question; (b) has commercial value because it is 
secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”). 
218 See id. at art. 43 (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has 
presented reasonably available evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified 
evidence relevant to substantiation of its claims which lies in the control of the opposing 
party, to order that this evidence be produced by the opposing party, subject in 
appropriate cases to conditions which ensure the protection of confidential 
information.”). 
219 Id. 
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D. Trade Secrets in the United States 
The applicable regulatory framework in the United States is 
slightly more complicated than in other countries. There is no 
binding federal civil law on trade secrets.220 Instead, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in 1979.221 The 
UTSA222 only has force of law through positive enactment by the 
states and all of the states (including Washington, DC; Puerto Ri-
co; and the US Virgin Islands) except for Massachusetts and New 
York have adopted the act.223 The states that have yet to enact the 
UTSA instead rely on common law to enforce trade secrets.224 The 
UTSA provides a definition of trade secret and any type of infor-
mation can be considered a trade secret as long as the definitional 
requirements are satisfied.225 Although it has been the subject of 
debate, virtually all of the states now view trade secrets as an intel-
lectual property right.226 
In addition to the UTSA, through the Economic Espionage Act 
of 1996 (“EEA”),227 the federal government protects trade secrets 
                                                                                                                            
220 Baker & McKenzie, Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in 
the Internal Market, app. 1 at 134 (April 2013) available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_appendix-1_en.pdf. 
221 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT PREFATORY NOTE (amended 1985). 
222 For purposes of this analysis, the provisions of the UTSA will be treated as the trade 
secret law for the entire United States and will be viewed from a federal level. This makes 
the United States easier to compare with the legal systems of China and Germany and 
facilitates a more uniform analysis. Furthermore, every state has its own procedural and 
evidentiary rules, so it is much cleaner to compare the United States on a federal level 
where only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply to the appropriate analyses. 
223 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Fact Sheet–Trade 
Secrets Act, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Trade%20Secrets%20Act. Although North Carolina has not adopted the UTSA, its Trade 
Secrets Protection Act is substantially similar to the UTSA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-
152-66-157 (2014). 
224 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 134. 
225 Id.; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (amended 1985).(“Trade secret means 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”). 
226 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 135. 
227 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
622 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:589 
 
through criminal enforcement sections.228 The act “is concerned in 
particular with economic espionage229 and foreign activities to ac-
quire US trade secrets230.”231 The EEA also explicitly calls for the 
court in any prosecution under the act to preserve the confidential-
ity of trade secrets by entering orders and taking other necessary 
and appropriate actions.232 However, the EEA is only applicable to 
conduct occurring outside of the United States if the offender is a 
citizen or permanent resident alien or an organization organized 
under United States law, or if “an act in furtherance of the offense 
was committed in the United States.”233 The EEA does not pro-
vide for a private right of action, so a company seeking civil reme-
dies for trade secret theft must generally look to state trade secret 
law, which typically is some form of the UTSA.234 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                            
228 See id. 
229 Economic espionage occurs when an actor “intending or knowing that the offense 
will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly- 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by 
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; (2) without authorization copies, 
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, 
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a 
trade secret; (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have 
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to 
commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with 
one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) 
through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012). 
230 Trade secret theft occurs when an actor “with intent to convert a trade secret, that is 
related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending 
or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly— 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by 
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; (2) without authorization copies, 
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, 
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such 
information; (3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have 
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to 
commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or 
more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and 
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1832 (2012). 
231 ONCIX, supra note 6, at iii. 
232 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2012). 
233 Id. § 1837. 
234 See id. §§ 1831–39. 
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even if a criminal case is pursued under the EEA, a party can still 
enforce its rights through parallel civil litigation because the EEA 
does not displace or preempt any other remedies provided by state 
law for the misappropriation of a trade secret.235 
In order to successfully commence a civil proceeding for trade 
secret infringement, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) the plaintiff 
has a protectable interest in a trade secret; (2) such trade secret has 
been misappropriated; and (3) such misappropriation236 has oc-
curred by the defendant.”237 Under the UTSA, the remedies avail-
able to a plaintiff are injunctive relief for actual and threatened mi-
sappropriation, or damages and the two are not mutually exclu-
sive.238 Additionally, preliminary injunctions are available if the 
plaintiff can show in federal court: (1) a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (3) ba-
lancing the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s hardships arising from 
granting or not granting the injunction is in the plaintiff’s favor; 
and (4) the issuance of the injunction is in the public interest.239 
Temporary restraining orders preventing the defendant from 
destroying evidence or data can also be obtained in federal court by 
                                                                                                                            
235 Id. § 1838 (“This chapter . . . shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other 
remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by the United States Federal, State, 
commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade 
secret . . . .”). 
236 The UTSA provides the definition of “misappropriation” as: (i) acquisition of a 
trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret 
was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person who: (a) used improper means to acquire 
knowledge of the trade secret; (b) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to 
know that is knowledge of the trade secret was (1) derived from or through a person who 
had utilized improper means to acquire it; (2) acquired under circumstances giving rise to 
a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (3) derived from or through a person who 
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (c) 
before a material change of his/her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a 
trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.2 (amended 1985). 
237 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220 at 135. 
238 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3 and cmts. (amended 1985). 
239 See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
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proving the same requirements for a preliminary injunction.240 Fur-
thermore, temporary restraining orders can be issued ex parte if 
the plaintiff alleges under oath specific facts that 
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage will result to it before the defendant 
can be heard, and the plaintiff certifies in writing the 
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it 
should not be required.241 
Criminal actions are also available under federal law if the theft 
of trade secrets is related to or in products within interstate com-
merce.242 However, in general, remedies are not available against a 
third party who obtained the information in good faith and is not 
subject to a confidentiality agreement, but once the party is given 
notice of the misappropriation, any continued use would become 
misappropriation under the UTSA.243 
Litigation in the United States includes a pre-trial process 
known as discovery, which involves the parties exchanging infor-
mation and potential evidence.244 In the federal system, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) generally governs the discovery 
process.245 However, disclosure of trade secrets during discovery 
presents a particular problem in litigation.246 The party from whom 
discovery is sought may move for a protective order from the court, 
which could require the trade secret not to be revealed or revealed 
in only a limited manner.247 These protective orders often impose 
different levels of access restriction to confidential information and 
could limit access to the trade secret so it is only available to the 
attorney and prevent the other party’s business from having access 
to it.248 Additionally, Section 5 of the UTSA explicitly requires a 
                                                                                                                            
240 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 217 at 136–37. 
241 Id. at 137; see also, FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1). 
242 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012). 
243 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at 137. 
244 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
245 Id. 
246 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 652. 
247 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
248 Baker & McKenzie, supra note 220, at app. 6, 652. 
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court to protect the secrecy of an alleged trade secret.249 When di-
rect evidence is unavailable, a party may have to resort to proving 
trade secret misappropriation through circumstantial evidence.250 
There is little statistical data available about trade secret litiga-
tion in the United States.251 However, trade secret litigation in the 
federal courts252 is growing exponentially, and at the projected rate, 
trade secret cases should double again by 2017.253 The following 
chart covers the rough percentages of the outcomes of preliminary 
motions filed for civil trade secret cases in federal court from 1950–
2008: 
Outcome by Procedural Posture 1950–2008254 










60.1% 39.1% 51.0% 
 
The primary value of looking at this data is for determining the 
change of success each party has at a particular procedural post-
                                                                                                                            
249 Id. (requiring a court to “preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by 
reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with 
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and 
ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret 
without prior court approval.”). 
250 See Ajaxo Inc. v. E*TRADE Group, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 221, 247 (Cal. App. 6th 
Dist. 2005). 
251 Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2010). 
252 For a statistical analysis of trade secret litigation in state courts, see David S. 
Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Weader, 
A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
253 Alemling et al., supra note 251, at 293. 
254 Id. at 316. 
255 An owner requested a preliminary injunction or TRO in roughly one-third of trade 
secret cases, while roughly one half of misappropriators filed motions to dismiss or a 
motion for summary judgment. Id. 
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ure.256 When compared to the data obtained from China in 2010 
and 2013 by dividing the number of motion applications by the total 
number of civil intellectual property cases, the results are stagger-
ing. Just based on motions for preliminary injunctions and evidence 
preservation/temporary restraining orders, trade secret owners in 
the United States are likely to be more successful in obtaining these 
important tools than trade secret owners in China. 
Pursuant to section 404 of the Prioritizing Resources and Or-
ganization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (“PRO IP Act”), 
the Department of Justice and the FBI provide data on the prose-
cution of intellectual property crimes, which includes trade secret 
theft and economic espionage under the EEA.257 
  
                                                                                                                            
256 Id. 
257 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012 1, 30 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/proipact/doj-pro-ip-rpt
2012.pdf. 
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DOJ Intellectual Property Crimes Prosecuted258 
District  





365 285 402 387 390 
Defendants 
Charged 
259 235 259 215 254 
Cases 
Charged 
197 173 177 168 178 
Defendants 
Sentenced 
242 223 207 208 202 
No Prison 
Term 
107 126 121 102 95 
1-12 Months 48 35 38 27 46 
13-24 
Months 
45 29 27 33 26 
25-36 
Months 
20 6 10 17 15 
37-60 
Months 
19 18 7 21 17 
60+ Months 3 9 4 8 3 
 
  
                                                                                                                            
258 Id. at 31. These numbers reflect criminal cases where the following charges were 
brought against a defendant: criminal copyright infringement, circumvention of copyright 
protection systems, economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, counterfeit labeling, 
criminal copyright infringement, live musical performance infringement, unauthorized 
recording of motion pictures, trafficking in counterfeit goods, and signal piracy. Id. at 30. 
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FBI Intellectual Property Investigations 
 FY 2010259 FY 2011260 FY 2012261 
Pending 
Investigations 
486 499 460 
Theft of Trade 
Secrets 




108 85 70 
Copyright In-
fringement (Oth-
er than Software) 
152 141 121 
Trademark In-
fringement 




27 21 16 
Counterfeit Air-
craft Parts 
21 24 17 
Counterfeit Elec-
trical Parts 
11 22 17 
Counterfeit Au-
tomotive Parts 
3 7 11 
Counterfeit 
Health Products 
15 45 53 
                                                                                                                            
259 FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2011/01/27/pro-ip-
fbi-report.pdf. 
260 FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fbi-pro-
ip-rpt2011.pdf. 
261 FBI, PRO IP ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2013/01/29/fbi-pro-
ip-rpt2012.pdf. 
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 FY 2010259 FY 2011260 FY 2012261 
Investigations 
Initiated 
218 235 170 
Arrests 66 93 111 
Information / 
Indictments 
73 79 66 
Convictions 79 79 74 
 
The data provided by the FBI shows a growth in the number of 
criminal trade secret investigations/cases in the United States. For 
the 2010 fiscal year, roughly 19% of the FBI’s pending intellectual 
property investigations were for trade secret theft.262 This grew to 
roughly 20% in the 2011 fiscal year263 and to roughly 23% in the 
2012 fiscal year.264 However, the actual rate at which criminal intel-
lectual property cases were concluded by the DOJ seems to be 
much slower than in China. For example, in 2013, China concluded 
9,212 criminal cases for intellectual property infringement out of 
the 9,331 that were filed,265 but in 2012, the DOJ only charged 178 
cases out of the 390 investigative matters received by Assistant US 
Attorneys.266 
One of the major drawbacks of a United States style discovery 
procedure is the potential for discovery abuse.267 According to 
Chief Judge Randall Rader of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, the greatest weakness of the United States’ 
court system is its expense and the driving factor for that expense is 
discovery excesses.268 This is especially true for intellectual proper-
                                                                                                                            
262 2010 REPORT, supra note 259. 
263 2011 REPORT, supra note 260. 
264 2012 REPORT, supra note 261. 
265 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
267 For a model order proposing a solution to remedy this problem in patent cases, see 
[Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (2011), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=22218. 
268 Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, E.D. Texas Judicial 
Conference, available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/
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ty cases, where in a 2010 report the Federal Judicial Center deter-
mined that cost of intellectual property cases was almost 62% high-
er than others.269 This expense problem can be exacerbated when 
attorneys use discovery as a tactical weapon.270 When used as a tac-
tical weapon, plaintiff’s attorneys often engage in open-ended 
“fishing expeditions” to burden defendants with costly discovery 
requests in the hope of forcing a quick settlement.271 Discovery 
abuse is one of the biggest causes for delay and congestion in the 
judicial system and by some estimates, discovery costs now ac-
count for roughly 50% to 90% of the total costs for a case.272 
E. Trade Secrets In Germany 
“Germany is the forum of choice for European patent and 
trade secret litigation, but discovery there can be limited.”273 As a 
civil law country, Germany provides for numerous provisions on 
protecting trade secrets, which can be found in a variety of differ-
ent codes and are scattered throughout German law.274 The most 
relevant provision for trade secret law is Section 17 of the Act 
Against Unfair Competition,275 which belongs under criminal law, 
but also serves as the basis for civil law claims.276 There is no statu-
tory definition of a trade secret under German law, but: 
[I]t is generally accepted that trade secrets incorpo-
rate (1) all information connected to the business 
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which is (2) not public knowledge, (3) shall be ex-
pressively kept secret for the purpose of economic 
interest, whereas (4) the business owner needs to 
have a legitimate commercial interest in keeping the 
information secret.277 
There is also a distinction between trade and business secrets: 
trade secrets relate to the commercial section of a business, while 
business secrets relate to the technical section of a business.278 
However, this distinction does not affect the level of protection 
offered because both enjoy the same protections.279 
Under German law, trade secrets are not considered to be an 
intellectual property right.280 This results in the distinction where 
intellectual property rights are “powerful ‘real’ rights whereas 
trade secrets are not protected as a ‘right,’ merely non-disclosure 
of the secret is protected.”281 Additionally, under German law the 
most important provisions protecting trade secrets are in the area 
of criminal law.282 Consequently, the owner of a trade secret must 
rely on the public prosecutor in most cases, which can take a while 
because the prosecutor acquires the evidence and information him-
self.283 
In Germany, the elements that must be established in order to 
commence legal proceedings differ for civil and criminal proce-
dure.284 In civil cases, the application and giving of evidence is of 
particular note to this analysis. When filing the application, the 
matter in dispute has to be precisely specified in a way so that the 
trade secret at issue can be identified.285 German case law can help 
the trade secret owner because it provides some assumptions such 
as prima facie evidence that may assist him in protecting his trade 
secret.286 Additionally, the plaintiff can often force the defendant to 
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let him view certain products or documents, which usually arises 
from Sections 809 and 810 of the Civil Code and Section 142 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.287 Importantly, Section 811 of the Civil 
Code provides that the party demanding the presentation of the 
products or documents must also bear the risks and the costs asso-
ciated with them, and that the party possessing the products or 
documents may refuse production until the costs are advanced and 
security is provided to mitigate the risks.288 There are also certain 
circumstances where the defendant is obliged to provide relevant 
information under good faith, provided in Section 242 of the Civil 
Code.289 Furthermore, in German procedure a party can only de-
mand documents he is able to specifically identify, and cannot de-
mand categories of documents, like in the United States.290 
Preliminary injunctions are also available in German civil cases. 
The preliminary injunctions in Germany are fairly swift and a ma-
jor advantage often associated with them is that there is no oral 
hearing.291 Additionally, the plaintiff does not need to fully prove 
his case in order to enjoy the benefits of a preliminary injunction, 
but only has to provide prima facie evidence in order to demon-
strate the likelihood of infringement. 292 However, one downside of 
the obtaining a preliminary injunction is that under Section 945 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant can claim damages 
against a plaintiff if the preliminary injunction was unfounded, re-
gardless of fault.293 The remedies available in a civil proceeding are: 
“cease-and-desist orders, claims for injunctions, claims to render 
account of profits for the purpose of calculating damages, claims 
for damages, and claims to hand back or destroy the protected in-
formation.”294 However, “preliminary injunctions are only availa-
ble for cease-and-desist claims as well as injunction claims, whereas 
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damage claims and or claims for information cannot be as-
serted.”295 
Criminal proceedings are often initiated when a trade secret 
owner files a complaint with the prosecuting authorities.296 This is 
fairly advantageous for the trade secret owner because one does not 
have to provide a lot of information because the authorities have 
the obligation to gather the evidence themselves.297 One major ad-
vantage to this is that the trade secret owner could use the informa-
tion gathered by the prosecutor in subsequent civil proceedings.298 
This is a tremendous advantage for the trade secret owner, espe-
cially when the owner does not have a sound means to support his 
arguments.299 One of the only drawbacks of this approach appears 
to be that it could take the prosecutor some time to investigate all 
of the evidence.300 
In Germany, civil proceedings in trade secret misappropriation 
cases usually last for nine to eighteen months from filing the claim 
to the decision in the first instance.301 This timeframe can vary 
based on the amount of evidence that has to be taken.302 Under 
German procedural law, the costs of the case depend on the value 
of the claim.303 The value of the claim is determined by the com-
mercial interest of the case and in typical cases is somewhere be-
tween € 100.000,00 and € 250.000,00.304 Trial costs usually 
amount from €2.500,00 to € 5.000,00 for the first instance.305 Sta-
tutory attorney fees usually range from € 4.000,00 to € 6.000,00 
for each party in the first instance.306 Additionally, the costs will 
usually shift from the winning party to the losing party.307 
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German law also has some important measures in place for pro-
tecting the secrecy of the information both during and after the 
proceedings conclude. First, under German procedural law, writ-
ten submissions are only disclosed to the judge and the opposing 
party.308 In regards to the oral hearing, the parties can apply to ex-
clude the public from the hearing, which is usually granted if a 
trade secret would be disclosed during the hearing and it would 
harm the trade secret owner if the general public knew the informa-
tion.309 The Germans also developed the “Düsseldorf Procedure,” 
which allows for the swift securing of evidence all while ensuring 
that confidentiality is preserved.310 Under the Düsseldorf Proce-
dure, “the court orders independent proceedings for the preserva-
tion of evidence as an interim injunction which is handed to the 
defendant together with a statement of claim so there is no chance 
to destroy evidence.”311 While this is going on, only the attorneys 
and an authorized expert are allowed to inspect the evidence so 
that the parties themselves do not get notice of the trade secrets.312 
This procedure was originally developed for patent cases, but there 
are discussions to extend this type of procedure to trade secret cas-
es because the principles are very similar.313 Although the number 
of trade secret cases heard by the German courts each year is un-
known, it is most likely lower in number than other intellectual 
property rights cases, such as patents, trademarks, and copy-
rights.314 
F. Relations Between China and Germany 
The Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of 
China have had a diplomatic relationship with each other since 
1972.315 Germany regards China as its most important economic 
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partner in Asia and is China’s leading trading partner in Europe.316 
Likewise, “China views Germany both economically and politically 
as its ‘gateway to Europe.’”317 China and Germany already have a 
strong working relationship in place. For example, the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (“GIZ”) is an in-
ternational enterprise owned by the German Federal Government, 
which promotes Germany’s objectives in international cooperation 
for sustainable development.318 The GIZ has been active in China 
for more than twenty-five years.319 In January of 2000, representa-
tives from the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Re-
public of China signed the German–Chinese Agreement on the Ex-
change and Cooperation in Legal Matters.320 This agreement 
served as the legal basis for the expansion and intensification of the 
mutual relationship between China and Germany in legal matters, 
and later merged into the German-Chinese Dialogue on the Rule of 
Law.321 This serves as a foundation for the cooperation between 
both countries and an annual symposium has been held since its 
inception in 2000.322 Notably, the eighth symposium held in Mu-
nich in 2008 focused on the effective protection of intellectual 
property and the tenth symposium held in Berlin in 2010 focused 
on unfair competition law, which serves as the basis for trade secret 
protections in both countries.323 
China’s Patent Law is also based on the patent laws of Germa-
ny and it has been recommended that China look to Germany to 
solve problems in areas of intellectual property, such as utility 
model abuse regarding utility design patents.324 Additionally, offic-
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ers in China’s intellectual property agencies also already have 
strong ties to Germany. For example, Tian Lipu, the former com-
missioner of the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), was a 
visiting scholar at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and Inter-
national Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Germany.325 
He also researched in the European Patent Office, the German Pa-
tent Office, and the German Patent Court on patent laws and sys-
tem.326 Given China’s already strong ties to Germany, it should not 
be difficult for them to change their trade secret system to be more 
like the German model. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of trade secret litigation is a growing concern 
for the private sector and foreign governments. Many companies 
are averse to storing their information in China because they are 
not confident in the legal protections or the available remedies.327 
This in turn tarnishes the global perception of the protections Chi-
nese law affords to intellectual property rights and hurts the Chi-
nese economy by excluding the most innovative technologies. Giv-
en the rise in trade secret misappropriation by Chinese nationals 
for the benefit of Chinese companies, trade secret owners in the 
United States need to have viable and effective methods to enforce 
their trade secret rights in China. Trade secret owners have several 
concerns regarding the enforcement of trade secret protections in 
China. They are primarily concerned ensuring that their trade se-
crets remain secret during and after court proceedings, the high 
burden placed on plaintiffs in trade secret misappropriation cases, 
and the remedies available to them, such as preliminary injunc-
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tions. These concerns all seem to stem from the overall difficulty in 
obtaining evidence in trade secret cases. While China has certainly 
taken steps in the right direction with its recent reforms, it still can 
use some improvements. 
The United States and Germany are regarded among the least 
threatening countries to trade secret owners. Both systems have 
their strengths and weaknesses, but China should try to adopt some 
of the German approaches in trade secret cases, especially when it 
comes to gathering evidence. While the discovery process in the 
United States is certainly effective, it is not a good fit for China for 
several reasons. First, the discovery process is incredibly expensive 
and time consuming. The courts of first instance in China open and 
close intellectual property cases in six months, which would still 
probably be in the discovery stage of similar litigation in the United 
States. While the United States has much better preliminary post-
ures for trade secret owners than China, the system suffers from 
many drawbacks such as discovery abuse. The two legal systems 
are very different and carrying over the discovery process to a civil 
law country that is used to be extremely efficient is unlikely to 
work. 
Modeling reforms after the German approach is a much more 
attractive option for China. First, this should be a relatively easy 
transition for China because China has strong ties to the German 
intellectual property system and has adopted other aspects of Ger-
many’s intellectual property laws. There are striking similarities 
between the two legal systems. Both are civil-law systems and both 
have their trade secret law grounded in unfair competition law. 
Both systems have a very fast docket: China’s being six months, 
while Germany’s is nine to eighteen months. Additionally, both 
provide criminal and civil avenues that trade secret owners can 
pursue in the event of misappropriation. These are strikingly simi-
lar as well: both systems allow for evidence obtained during crimi-
nal proceedings to be used in subsequent civil proceedings. How-
ever, Germany is more effective in several key areas that China 
should consider reforming. First, in Germany the prosecutors are 
much more open to taking trade secret cases in criminal proceed-
ings. This change is key for China and should not be too difficult to 
implement. China should get their police more active in taking 
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trade secret cases, which would alleviate a lot of the evidentiary 
concerns because they have the resources and authority to do so. 
One potential downside is that this change may slow things up a 
bit, but that is a risk worth taking. 
Second, China should be much more open to granting prelimi-
nary motions, such as preliminary injunctions and evidence preser-
vation orders. While there have been recent changes to the Civil 
Procedure Law and China is beginning to grant more preliminary 
injunctions, it is still too early to tell if this will be a continuing 
trend. China could follow Germany’s approach of allowing a de-
fendant to recover damages if the preliminary injunction turns out 
to be unwarranted. This would help prevent plaintiffs from frivo-
lously filing for preliminary injunctions and abusing this useful tool. 
A final important change China could make is adopting some-
thing similar to Germany’s Düsseldorf Procedure. The Düsseldorf 
Procedure is a very attractive option because it facilitates the swift 
recovery of evidence, while maintaining confidentiality for both 
parties. It would alleviate two of the major concerns trade secret 
owners have: First, It would allow the trade secret owners to obtain 
sufficient evidence to support a claim in the event of misappropria-
tion. Second, it would ensure that if the trade secret owner did de-
cide to file a claim, that his trade secrets would remain confidential 
and he would not risk disclosing them to the general public. One of 
the main reasons why trade secret owners choose not to litigate is 
that the risks of litigation often outweigh any possible benefits be-
cause owners face a very real risk of losing the confidentiality of 
their information. Adopting the Düsseldorf Procedure will help 
alleviate these concerns and will hopefully make trade secret hold-
ers more confident in China’s trade secret enforcement. 
 
